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ABSTRACT 
The Impact of ‘Central Places’ on Spatial Spending Patterns:  
Evidence from Flemish Local Government Cultural Expenditures  
by Kristien Werck, Bruno Heyndels and Benny Geys * 
Governments often see it as their responsibility to support cultural life and at 
times spend a significant amount of resources in the pursuit of this goal. The 
present paper analyses whether and how municipalities influence each other in 
this decision to spend resources on the arts (using data on local government 
cultural spending in 304 Flemish municipalities in 2002). Following ‘central place 
theory’, the focal point of the analysis is the idea that – especially for cultural 
expenditures – large municipalities (and, specifically, ‘central places’) may affect 
their neighbours’ behaviour differently than small municipalities. The empirical 
analysis is supportive of this idea. Indeed, we show that Flemish municipalities’ 
cultural spending is generally positively affected by that in neighbouring 
municipalities. This pattern is, however, significantly more complex for 
municipalities neighbouring the 13 largest Flemish cities. 
 
Keywords: Central places, cultural policy, Flemish municipalities, local government 
expenditures, spatial interdependence, asymmetric response  
 JEL Classification: Z11, H40, H72 
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Der Einfluss ‘Zentraler Orte’ auf räumliche Ausgabenmuster: eine 
empirische Studie zu den kommunalen Ausgaben für Kultur in Flandern 
Regierungen sehen sich gemeinhin in der  Verantwortung, für die Unterstützung 
des kulturellen Lebens zu sorgen und wenden hierfür erhebliche Ressourcen 
auf. Im vorliegenden Artikel wird analysiert, ob und wie sich Gemeinden 
gegenseitig bei der Entscheidung für  Ressourcenaufwendungen im Bereich 
Kunst und Kultur beeinflussen. Diese Analyse beruht auf Daten über Ausgaben 
im Kulturbereich von 304 flämischen Gemeinden im Jahr 2002. Der „central 
place“-Theorie folgend liegt der Schwerpunkt der Analyse auf der Idee, dass 
gerade im kulturellen Bereich der Einfluss großer Gemeinden (und 
insbesondere von „zentralen Orten“) auf die Entscheidung der Nachbargemein-
den ein anderer ist, als der Einfluss kleinerer Gemeinden. Die empirische 
Analyse stützt diesen Ansatz. In der Tat lässt sich zeigen, dass die Ausgaben 
im Kulturbereich flämischer Gemeinden positiv durch die Ausgaben ihrer 
Nachbargemeinden beeinflusst werden. Für die Nachbargemeinden der 13 
größten flämischen Städte ist dieses Muster jedoch erheblich komplexer.    1
1. Introduction 
 
A considerable amount of scholarly attention has recently been devoted to spatial patterns in 
(local) governments’ fiscal policies.  Recent reviews of this literature by Brueckner (2003) 
and Revelli (2005) indicate that fiscal decisions in neighbouring jurisdictions tend to play a 
prominent role in the decision to set one’s own tax rate or level of public goods provision.  
This is also likely to be the case for cultural expenditures.  The reason is that the benefits of 
cultural spending in one jurisdiction cannot easily be shielded from inhabitants of other 
jurisdictions.  For example, lower ticket prices or higher quality due to a subsidization of the 
local theatre, museum or exhibitions hall will also benefit consumers from neighbouring 
jurisdictions (unless, of course, price discrimination is applied whereby only inhabitants can 
enjoy lower ticket prices).  The resulting ‘spillover’ effects make that the optimal policy 
decision of one jurisdiction should take into account the policies chosen in neighbouring 
jurisdictions, leading to an observable spatial pattern in cultural expenditures (Kelejian and 
Robinson, 1993; Brueckner, 2003; Solé-Ollé, 2006).   
 
Though, as mentioned, significant attention has been granted to such spatial 
interdependencies, Traub (2005) and Lundberg (2006) are – to the best of our knowledge – 
the only papers thus far assessing spatial patterns in cultural expenditures.
1  In extension of 
their work, we not only test for a spatial pattern in cultural spending across jurisdictions (i.c. 
Flemish municipalities), but also – and more importantly – examine whether asymmetries in 
this policy interdependence occur in function of the size of the various municipalities.  Such 
asymmetric reactions to neighbours’ spending depending on its urban status have not been 
studied before, yet might play an especially important role in our setting.  Indeed, it has been 
argued that cultural goods are “pre-eminently central place functions” (Heilbrun, 1992, 205).  
The ensuing innate advantage of large municipalities in providing such goods can be expected   2
to affect the reaction of their neighbours to their level of cultural spending.  Small 
municipalities – taking into account their (absolute) cost disadvantage relative to their large 
neighbours – might therefore be more liable to free-ride on large neighbour’s cultural policies.   
 
Our empirical analysis studies cultural expenditures across 304 Flemish municipalities in the 
year 2002.  The findings indicate that cultural spending in one municipality tends to be 
positively related to spending in neighbouring municipalities.  Interestingly, however, our 
analysis supports the proposition that there is an asymmetry in this spatial interaction.  In fact, 
allowing for ‘size’ effects by giving the 13 largest Flemish cities a special status in the 
analysis indicates a more complex pattern in spatial interdependencies. 
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a theoretical 
framework of the spatial interdependence between jurisdictions, while Section 3 gives an 
overview of the institutional setting of local cultural policy in Flanders.  Section 4 presents the 
empirical analysis and section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Theoretical framework 
 
2.1. SPILLOVER EFFECTS AND FREE-RIDING 
Governments generally are no isolated actors.  Decisions made by one government are likely 
to have effects on (and be affected by) the decisions of other governments.
2  This is especially 
probable in our setting since, firstly, the average municipality in Flanders is only 44 km² in 
size.  Hence, the average distance between two municipalities can be estimated at 
approximately 7 km.  Although distance is often argued to play a crucial role in deciding 
whether or not to visit a cultural event (e.g. Verhoeff, 1992; Bille Hansen, 1997; Boter et al., 
2005; De Graaff et al., 2007), these limited distances (and therefore travel costs) imply that   3
the impediment to participate in cultural activities in neighbouring municipalities is small.  
Secondly, municipalities cannot easily exclude non-residents from the cultural services they 
provide.  For example, subsidization of the local theatre, museum or exhibitions hall lowers 
prices for residents as well as non-residents (unless perfect price discrimination on the basis 
of residency is established, which is generally not the case) and both groups therefore benefit 
from the subsidy.  Finally, there may well be a high degree of substitutability of cultural 
activities across municipalities.  The organisation of a music event, arts fair or theatre 
performance in one municipality may not be all that different from those that are (or might be) 
organised in neighbouring municipalities.  This implies that cultural provisions in different 
municipalities are likely to be close substitutes and people might well be indifferent between 
consuming the arts either ‘at home’ or ‘abroad’.  Interestingly, recent empirical evidence from 
Swedish municipalities indeed suggests that recreational and cultural activities across 
jurisdictions are strategic substitutes (Lundberg, 2006). 
 
If travel costs are low, cultural goods are non-excludable public goods and residents obtain 
utility from cultural services provided in the own municipality as well as from those supplied 
in neighbouring municipalities (that is, if there are spillovers from local cultural service 
provisions), inhabitants of one municipality may jump the border and enjoy the services 
provided elsewhere.  Such spillovers – and the cross-border consumption of the arts it implies 
– entails that each municipality’s decision on cultural service provision will depend on how 
much its peers are investing in this policy field.  In other words, there will be interdependence 
in local cultural policies (Brueckner, 2003).   
 
In the absence of policy coordination across municipalities to internalise these spillover 
effects (or externalities), it can be expected that each local government will tend to free-ride 
on the provision of the others and under-provide cultural services.  This is a common   4
prediction of theories concerning collection action failures (Olson, 1971).  One reason for this 
behaviour in our specific setting is that the demand for cultural activities in a given area is 
finite.  This limited number of potential consumers implies that only a certain level of supply 
is (economically) viable.  Provision beyond this ‘satiation point’ is unwarranted (or, at least, 
inefficient from an economic point of view).  Consequently, the provision of cultural activities 
by neighbouring jurisdictions reduces the economic rational for a jurisdiction’s spending on 
cultural activities (especially when these are substitutes and people are indifferent as to where 
to consume these goods: ‘at home’ or ‘abroad’).  Another reason is that the provision of 
cultural goods requires funding.  Levying taxation to provide these funds is likely to be 
disadvantageous in terms of popularity (or re-election odds) (see Geys and Vermeir, 2007, for 
a review).  These (electoral) costs of taxation can be forgone by relying (or ‘free-riding’) on 
other jurisdictions’ cultural spending to fulfil the cultural needs of ones citizenry.  Under the 
(substitutability and indifference) conditions stated above, such free-riding behaviour implies 
that high levels of cultural expenditures in one jurisdiction may reduce such expenditures in 
its neighbours. 
 
It is important to note that such strategic free-riding behaviour induces a negative slope of the 
reaction function (which represents a municipality’s optimal response to the policy followed 
in neighbouring municipalities).  This leads us to our first hypothesis: 
 
H1:  Cultural expenditures in one municipality deter cultural spending among its 




   5
2.2. THE ROLE OF CULTURE AS A ‘CENTRAL PLACE’ FUNCTION 
 
This general characterisation of neighbourhood effects in cultural spending is not the end of 
the story.  Often, cultural activities are economically viable only if a critical mass of 
consumers can be attained.  Such thresholds are more easily reached in larger, or more 
densely populated municipalities, as these can more easily exploit economies of scale.  In fact, 
consistent with central place theory, the number of performing arts organisations in 
metropolitan places in the US has been found to be a (linear) positive function of population 
size: “a few large cities have the lion’s share of cultural institutions” (Blau and Hall, 1986, 
47).  Cultural goods may thus be “pre-eminently central place functions”, giving large 
municipalities an innate advantage in providing such goods (Heilbrun, 1992, 205).  The 
benefits from this exploitation of economies of scale are not restricted to the producers of 
cultural activities but might also benefit the local government.  Indeed, one additional euro 
spent in larger municipalities – or, arguably more accurately, ‘central places’ – to supply 
cultural activities may be (much) more productive than one additional euro spent by a small 
municipality.   
 
This advantage for central place governments can be expected to affect the reaction of its 
neighbours to its level of cultural spending.  That is, the government of a municipality 
adjoining a central place takes into account its relative cost disadvantage.  It realizes that the 
(electoral) benefits of reducing residents’ travel costs (or increasing the option value of the 
arts)
3 by providing cultural services in one’s hometown are unlikely to offset the (electoral) 
costs – in terms of additional taxation – of providing similar cultural services as a central 
place.  As a consequence, it will be more liable to free-ride on its neighbour’s cultural 
policies.  At one extreme, it can even happen that a local government located next to a central 
place no longer provides cultural services since residents can jump the border to consume   6
such services and, given its size, it is simply too costly to provide these services itself.  The 
innate cost advantage of larger municipalities (and especially central places) in providing 
cultural goods therefore leads to the following hypothesis: 
 
H2a:   As the incentives to free-ride are larger for neighbours of central places, 
their reaction to cultural spending by these central places is more negative 
than the general reaction to small neighbours’ cultural spending. 
 
Still, if central places have a cost advantage over other municipalities in the provision of 
cultural services, this can also be expected to affect their own behaviour relative to what their 
neighbours are doing.  In fact, they might simply have no incentive – or possibility – to free-
ride on what their (smaller) neighbours are doing.  This leads to the following hypothesis 
(which is complementary to H2a): 
 
H2b:   As the incentives to free-ride are smaller for central places, their reaction 
to cultural spending by their smaller neighbours is less negative than the 
general reaction to small neighbours’ cultural spending. 
 
Finally, given the innate advantage and larger provision of cultural goods in central places, 
the citizenry of municipalities neighbouring such central places might well focus its attention 
exclusively on the cultural provisions in the central place.  The reason is that this is where 
they are most likely to turn to in order to fulfil their cultural desires.  This allows the local 
government of municipalities neighbouring central places to similarly neglect these smaller 
neighbours’ policy decisions.  As a consequence, smaller municipalities surrounding a central 
place can be expected to pay less attention to the policy decisions of their other (smaller) 
neighbours.     7
 
H3:   Neighbours of central places are less likely to take the decisions of their 
non central place neighbours into account than municipalities that do not 
adjoin a central place. 
 
2.3. ACQUIRED TASTES, REFERENCE POINTS AND INTELLECTUAL TRENDS 
 
Spillover effects and the resulting free-riding behaviour are not the only reason why 
municipal cultural policies might be interdependent. In fact, several arguments have been 
brought forward in the literature to expect a positive (rather than negative) relation between 
neighbours’ fiscal policies.  A first argument builds on the well-established idea that the arts 
are an acquired taste (Marshall, 1891) whereby current consumption leads to further future 
consumption (for empirical evidence, see Morrison and West, 1986; O’Hagan, 1996).  One 
theoretical approach to model this argues that the acquisition of human capital attributes 
associated with the arts (such as experience and understanding) through its consumption 
reduces the shadow price of the arts, which instigates further demand (cfr. Becker and 
Murphy, 1988).  Another line of argument assumes consumers are uncertain or ignorant about 
their utility function and learn their own preference structures through consumption 
experiences (i.e. “learning by consumption”; cfr. Pollak, 1970; Lévy-Garboua and 
Montmarquette, 1996; Seaman, 2005).  Importantly, under such theories cross-border 
consumption of the arts leads taste acquisition – and increasing demand for cultural activities 
– not only in the municipality that originally spent resources on cultural policies, but also in 
municipalities that surround it.
4 
 
A second argument for positive spatial interdependence starts from the idea that people often 
resort to relative performance evaluations.  Neighbouring governments’ policies are used as a   8
reference point to judge the policies provided by their own government.
5  Importantly, such 
relative performance assessments generate so-called transaction (dis)utility to voters (Thaler, 
1985; see also Ashworth and Heyndels, 2000).  This is the additional utility that people 
experience – besides the acquisition utility from the policy itself – by assessing its merit (or 
lack thereof) relative to a reference point (in this case, neighbours’ policies).  Applying the 
argument to our setting implies that the absence of cultural activities in one’s own 
municipality appears worse when neighbouring municipalities do provide cultural activities.  
Hence, higher spending on cultural activities in neighbouring municipalities may put pressure 
on the local government to increase spending for such activities.  Besides the generation of 
transaction (dis)utility, relative performance assessment also provides politicians caring about 
re-election with an incentive to mimic policy decisions in neighbouring jurisdictions (e.g. 
Salmon, 1987; Case et al., 1993; Besley and Case, 1995).  The reason is that voters use 
neighbouring jurisdictions’ policy outcomes to assess the quality of their incumbents (and re-
elect or replace them accordingly), thereby bringing politicians into a form of “yardstick 
competition” (cfr. Shleifer, 1985).  Mimicking behaviour is a (rational) response to such 
yardstick competition and entails that higher cultural spending in one municipality leads to 
higher spending in neighbouring municipalities. 
 
A third and final alternative explanation for a positive spatial pattern in cultural expenditures 
may be that “individuals in the same group tend to behave similarly because they have similar 
individual characteristics” (Manski, 1993, 533).  That is, neighbours’ spending patterns 
coincide simply because their populations (or politicians) are similar, leading them to follow 
similar policies.  One can then speak of a common (intellectual) trend rather than effective 
spatial interaction (Redoano, 2007). 
   9
H4:  Cultural expenditures in one municipality induces cultural spending among 
its neighbours (represented by a positive slope of the reaction function). 
 
Before turning to the empirical assessment of these hypotheses, it is crucial to point out that 
the arguments raised above build on the idea that politicians ‘for some reason’ do what 
proponents of cultural spending desire.  One possible reason might be that politicians are 
mostly highly educated and – given that the audience of cultural activities is of “significantly 
higher educational, occupational and income status” (Throsby, 1994, 8) – may therefore be 
inclined towards cultural service provision anyway.  However, the preferences of politicians 
need not be in line with those of the users of cultural services for our arguments to hold.  
Another means of achieving the same outcome is to presume that, though arts consumers are 
generally only a small subset of the population (see e.g. Lévy-Garboua and Montmarquette, 
1996), they might well constitute a special interest group (cfr. Mueller and Murrell, 1986) 
with an incentive to spread at least part of the costs of their cultural consumption over the 
entire population (e.g. Withers, 1979; Krebs and Pommerehne, 1995; Traub and Missong, 
2005).  As they are likely to be faced with little organized opposition on this issue (Schulze 
and Rose, 1998), they can be expected to have the ability to shape cultural policies in their 
own favour.  Finally, when cultural policies are perceived to have an option or bequest value, 
a significant willingness-to-pay for such services may also exist among the group not making 
direct use of them (cfr. Frey, 2005).
6  Even non-consumers may then pressure local 
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3. Data and institutional setting 
 
Belgium is a federal country with a highly complex institutional structure.  The country 
consists of three language ‘Communities’ (the Dutch-speaking Community, the French-
speaking Community and the German-speaking Community) and three territorial ‘Regions’ 
(Flemish Region, Walloon Region and Brussels Capital Region).  Cultural policy is a 
responsibility of the Communities.  This implies that cultural policy in the Flemish (Walloon) 
Region is under the control of the Dutch-speaking (French-speaking) Community.  In the 
Brussels Region, where Dutch and French are official languages, the Dutch- and French-
speaking Communities exercise their powers for their respective language groups (Coffé, 
2006).  Cultural policies by the Communities build mainly on subsidization rather than direct 
provision through state-owned cultural institutions.  In fact, subsidies from Community-level 
governments are an indispensable source of income for many cultural organisations in 
Belgium (a comparable reliance on public subsidies for example exists for German orchestras; 
see Schulze and Rose, 1998). 
 
Even though cultural policy is a Community-level responsibility, the municipalities in 
Belgium – and especially in Flanders – are in fact the prime source of cultural expenditures in 
Belgium.  Looking at the period between 1995 and 1999, Flemish municipalities account for 
33 percent of total cultural expenditures in Belgium, the Dutch- and French-speaking 
Communities for 25 and 20 percent respectively and municipalities in the Brussels and 
Walloon Region for 10 and 4 percent respectively (Ministerie van de Vlaamse Gemeenschap 
2002, 134).  Given their status as ‘big spenders’ on cultural activities, and the absence of 
municipal-level data for the other Regions, our empirical analysis will concentrate on the 
Flemish municipalities. 
   11
Taking a closer look at cultural spending in the Flemish municipalities in 2002, they together 
spent €591.4 million.  This consists of all expenditures booked in the municipal budget under 
code 789 (“youth, community development and arts”) and includes spending on youth care, 
museums, exhibitions, historic buildings, open-air recreation, visual arts, festivities, 
performing arts and so on.  Including ‘non-art’ spending entails, however, a broad 
interpretation of ‘culture’.  Fortunately, the data allow us to separate spending on arguably 
non-cultural elements (such as youth care and open-air recreation) from more arts-oriented 
spending (such as museums, exhibitions and performing arts).  Expenditures representing 
culture in this stricter sense amounted to €214.3 million in 2002 and fall into five categories: 
“culture and recreation” (52.27%), “museums” (19.24%), “festivities and ceremonies” 
(12.79%), “playhouses and performing arts” (10.57%) and “historical monuments, visual arts 
and exhibitions, literature and specialised libraries” (5.14%).  These expenditures are financed 
from the general municipal budget, which essentially pools resources from tax revenues, 
general purpose grants, user charges and so on.  Hence, the opportunity cost of an extra euro 
cultural spending equals reduced resources for other service areas. 
 
While all municipalities account for cultural expenditures under code 789, this does not 
necessarily imply they all book the exact same types of spending under this code (or its 
subdivisions).  In fact, there may be some difference across municipalities in what they 
perceive as cultural spending, and therefore book under code 789.  For example, certain 
expenditures may be deemed ‘culture and recreation’ in one municipality but ‘youth care’ in 
another.  This introduces some degree of ‘measurement error’ into the dataset.  Nonetheless, 
there are a number of elements indicating the reliability of the data employed here.  First, the 
municipalities have to follow relatively strict rules and guidelines in their accounting 
concerning, for example, the representation of given types of spending in the accounts (such 
as depreciation of capital stock).  Moreover, the supervising regional government at times   12
sends round circulars indicating how a particular type of spending or income should be 
booked.  Also, following a municipal debt crisis in Belgium in the early 1980’s, supervision 
of municipal accounts has increased strongly.  These elements – guidelines, supervision and 
circulars – tend to increase conformity in accounting procedures across municipalities and 
thereby the consistency of the data employed here (which were obtained from the supervising 
regional government). 
 
Where municipal cultural policy has traditionally been fragmented and autonomous, a 
Flemish Community decree to stimulate a more structured local-level cultural policy (i.e. 
“decreet houdende het stimuleren van een kwalitatief en integraal lokaal cultuurbeleid”) has 
become effective since 1 January 2002.  Under the new decree, municipalities are encouraged 
– but not obliged – to draw up a general cultural policy plan and to appoint a local cultural 
policy co-ordinator.  In return, they receive financial support to pay the cultural policy co-
ordinator (i.e. €25,000 or €50,000 depending on the municipality’s population) and to finance 
the implementation of the plan (i.e. an additional €1 per head of the population).  Between 1 
January 2002 and 22 October 2003 (the latest data available), 206 municipalities in the 
Flemish and Brussels Regions submitted a cultural policy plan (136 of which where 
approved) and 173 municipalities appointed a local cultural policy co-ordinator (Ministerie 
van de Vlaamse Gemeenschap, 2003, 164).  The additional government support under this 
new decree in 2002 amounted to €14.4 million, which is a relatively small amount compared 
to the overall cultural expenditures of the municipalities.
7 
 
Still, given that the cost of submitting a cultural policy plan can be assumed equal across 
municipalities, this submission reflects the intention of the municipality to spend resources on 
cultural policies.  Thus, observed spending levels (even if increased by support from higher 
level governments) are likely to accurately proxy the desired level of municipal cultural   13
spending.  Moreover, notwithstanding this recent legislation, local politicians play a crucial 
role and enjoy considerable independence in determining local cultural policy.  Ultimately, 
the decision to spend resources on culture at the municipal level remains the political 
responsibility of the College of Mayor and Aldermen (the executive body of the municipal 
government).  Therefore, local politicians continue to have a predominant impact on local 
cultural spending decisions.  
 
 
4. Empirical analysis 
 
4.1. MODEL SPECIFICATION 
 
Our analysis concentrates on cultural expenditures in 304 Flemish municipalities in the year 
2002.
8  The dependent variable equals the per capita level of local government cultural 
spending in this budgetary year (as defined by the ‘strict’ definition introduced in the previous 
section).
9  To address the hypotheses raised in section 2, we estimate (in matrix notation and 
with subscript t for time): 
  
EXPt = α + ϕ NEIGHt + et   (1) 
 
The precise definition of the neighbourhood variable (NEIGHt) depends on the hypothesis 
being tested.  To test H1 (versus H4), NEIGHt is defined as the (non-weighted) average level 
of per capita cultural spending in neighbouring municipalities.  Specifically, NEIGHt = 
W*EXPt, where W is a (304x304) row-normalized spatial weights matrix indicating whether 
or not two municipalities are neighbours and where NEIGHt and EXPt are (304x1) vectors.
10    14
Neighbours are thereby defined in a geographical sense as two municipalities that share a 
border.  Thus the weights (ωij) in W can be written as: 
 
ωij = 




   (2) 
 
where wij = 1 if i and j are contiguous.  The entries in each row of the matrix W are thus 1/n 
(with n the number of neighbours of the municipality in row i) when the municipality in row i 
shares a border with the municipality in column j and 0 otherwise.  The simple border-sharing 
criterion employed here can be justified since distance plays a central role in deciding whether 
or not to visit a cultural event (Verhoeff, 1992; Bille Hansen, 1997; Boter et al., 2005; De 
Graaff et al., 2007).
11 
 
However, as argued in H2a, cultural spending by larger cities (or, more specifically, central 
places) may instigate more free-riding by their neighbours.  We test this proposition in two 
ways.  First, as a second specification of NEIGHt, we introduce the population-weighted 
average level of per capita cultural spending in neighbouring municipalities.  The elements in 
the spatial weights matrix W (ωij) are then redefined as: 
 
ωij = 
∑ ≠i j j ij
j ij
) pop   .   w (
pop   .   w
 (3) 
 
where wij = 1 if i and j are contiguous and popj equals the population in municipality j.  As a 
larger weight is here attached to expenditures of large neighbours, support of H2a would 
imply smaller coefficients for the neighbourhood effects compared to the non-weighted 
results.
12  Secondly, we identify a number of municipalities that are generally regarded as   15
central places in Flanders and award these a ‘special’ status in the analysis.
13  That is, we 
essentially introduce two separate weights matrices (W1 and W2) in the model, thus also 
obtaining two neighbourhood variables for each municipality.  The weights in the matrix W1 
are given by: 
 
ωij = 
∑ ≠i j j j ij
j j ij
) CP   .   pop   .   w (
CP   .   pop   .   w
 (4) 
 
where wij and popj are defined as before and CPj = 1 if municipality j is one of the 13 central 
places in Flanders.  This results in a (population-weighted) average level of per capita cultural 
spending in those of a municipality’s neighbours that are central places.  This variable 
(denoted “CP-neighbours spending”) thus measures the effect of central places’ cultural 
spending on their neighbours and has non-zero values only for neighbours of central places.  
The second weights matrix (W2) has weights as follows: 
 
ωij = 
∑ ≠i j j j ij
j j ij
) NCP   .   pop   .   w (
NCP   .   pop   .   w
 (5) 
 
where NCPj = 1 if municipality j is not one of the 13 central places in Flanders.  This leads to 
a (population-weighted) average level of cultural spending in those of a municipality’s 
neighbours that are not central places.  This variable (denoted “NonCP-neighbours spending”) 
measures the effect of non-central places’ spending decisions on their neighbours.  Support of 
H2a would imply a (significantly) larger coefficient estimate for the latter variable.
14  
 
Finally, some municipalities only have ‘small’ (i.e. non-central places) neighbours (in our 
sample, this is the case for 198 municipalities) while others’ neighbours include both small   16
municipalities and central places (this is the case for 106 municipalities).  As H3 argues that a 
municipality may react differently to small neighbours’ spending depending on whether or not 
it also borders a central place, we split our dataset in two subsamples: those neighbouring 
central places and those that do not.  Support of H3 would imply that significant interaction 
effects only exist in the latter subsample.  Since neighbours of central places might simply 




While assessing the existence of neighbourhood effects in municipal cultural spending, we 
follow the literature in controlling for a number of socio-economic, financial and political 
characteristics of the municipalities (e.g. Withers, 1979; Schulze and Rose, 1998; Getzner, 
2002).  A variety of theoretical models support the inclusion of such variables: e.g. the 
median voter model (Black, 1948), the Leviathan model (Brennan and Buchanan, 1977), 
special interest group models (Mueller and Murrell, 1986) or general political economy 
models (Craig and Inman, 1986).  The final estimation equation has the following form (in 
matrix notation and with subscript t for time): 
 
EXPt = α + ϕ NEIGHt + λ SOCIOt + θ FINANCEt + δ POLt + et   (7) 
 
SOCIO is a 304x7 matrix containing data from seven socio-economic control variables 
(summary statistics are provided in table A1 in appendix).  The first socio-economic control is 
population size (in natural logarithms).  Larger municipalities are likely to have a higher per 
capita demand for public expenditures in general (and cultural spending in particular; Schulze 
and Rose, 1998).  Moreover, they may have a centre function for cultural public goods 
(Heilbrun, 1992).  Both elements lead us to expect higher per capita spending on cultural 
policies in larger municipalities.  Still, since provision of cultural goods is often characterised   17
by significant fixed costs, the existence of economies of scale could lead to an offsetting 
effect (as public cultural expenditures will then increase less than proportionally to the total 
population).  Secondly, we include population density (inhabitants per km²) as a measure for 
the degree of urbanisation.  Higher population density tends to decrease the average distance 
people must traverse to attend the arts within their municipality.  As distance affects the 
attendance likelihood, demand for – and public expenditure on – cultural activities is likely to 
be larger in more densely populated areas (Withers, 1979). 
 
We also account for the share of inhabitants under 19 years of age and the share of those 
above age 65.  It has been argued that the elderly are likely to support the public provision of 
cultural activities as their opportunity costs to consume such activities are lower 
(Pommerehne, 1982; Schulze and Ursprung, 2000).  Therefore, we expect a positive relation 
between the proportion of the population over age 65 and the level of public cultural 
expenditures.  The effect of the proportion of inhabitants under 19 is a priori ambiguous.  On 
the one hand, young people are generally less interested in (especially highbrow) cultural 
activities and the presence of a large share of (very) young inhabitants increases the 
opportunity costs of time for their parents – thereby decreasing overall support for high 
cultural expenditures.  On the other hand, the arts have been argued to have a ‘bequest’ value 
(e.g. Bille Hansen, 1997; Schulze and Ursprung, 2000).  This could lead to increased support 
for public intervention and public cultural expenditures when the share of young inhabitants is 
higher. 
 
Real taxable per capita income (in €1000) and the level of education (as the share of 
inhabitants older than 20 with a college or university degree) are included to pick up demand 
side effects (Schulze and Rose, 1998).  Audiences and willingness to pay for the arts are 
generally higher among the wealthy and highly educated (e.g. Pommerehne, 1982; Throsby,   18
1994; Bille Hansen, 1997; Schulze and Ursprung, 1998; Getzner, 2004).  Moreover, as 
mentioned earlier, the wealthy and well-educated may constitute a special interest group 
striving for cultural provisions, which they consume ,  t o  b e  p a i d  a t  l east partly from the 
general municipal budget (Withers, 1979; Schulze and Rose, 1998).  Somewhat related, we 
also include the rate of unemployment.  Given the positive income elasticity of demand for 
cultural goods, we expect lower demand for (and lower public spending on) cultural activities 
when the share of unemployed increases.  This may, however, be counteracted by the fact that 
the unemployed have more leisure time and lower opportunity costs of time.   
 
These socio-economic variables are complemented with three variables to control for the 
financial situation of the municipality (FINANCE) (Krebs and Pommerehne, 1995).  Firstly, 
we include the level of per capita financial support some municipalities receive under the new 
Flemish legislation concerning local cultural policy (see section 3).  These subsidies can be 
expected to lead to higher cultural spending (cfr. Hofferbert and Urice, 1985).
16  Secondly, we 
include the level of general purpose grants (per capita, in €1000) received from higher level 
governments.  It can be expected that local governments provide more public goods when 
these can be financed (at least partly) through grants as the perceived cost of spending then is 
lower (cfr. the literature on fiscal illusion and so-called flypaper effects: e.g. Bradford and 
Oates, 1971; Hines and Thaler, 1995; Heyndels, 2001).  Finally, we introduce the lagged level 
of long-term local public debt (per capita, in €1000) to gauge the strain of past (investment) 
decisions on municipal finances (Schulze and Rose, 1998; Getzner, 2004).  While loans allow 
a municipality to spread its investment costs over the (economic) lifetime of the investment, 
interest and amortization of existing debts must be paid out of the current budget.  Hence, 
higher levels of historical debt are likely to translate into lower levels of public goods 
provided in the current period. 
   19
The model is completed by two political control variables (POLI) that tap into the 
characteristics of the local government in 2002 (and which was elected in 2000).  Firstly, we 
examine whether the ideological persuasion of the local government affects the level of 
cultural spending.  Left-wing parties are generally argued to be more in favour of government 
intervention, while right-wing parties tend to support the workings of the market (Hibbs, 
1977; Tavares, 2004).  Survey research from the U.S. likewise indicates that people with a 
self-described right-wing ideology are more opposed to public support for the arts than people 
with a left-wing ideology (Brooks, 2001).  Left-wing governments may thus be more prone to 
subsidize the cultural sector (leading to higher cultural spending).  However, this relation is 
not self-evident.  When wealthier voters (who generally have a lower probability of voting for 
left-wing parties) have a more positive attitude towards cultural policy, this relation may even 
reverse (see, e.g., Schulze and Rose, 1998). We measure the ideological complexion of the 
local government as ∑ =
n
i i i Complexion p
1 ) . ( , where pi is the seat share of party i in the College 
of Mayor and Aldermen and ‘Complexion’ refers to the ideological position of this party on a 
Left-Right scale (from 0 to 10).
17  The second political control variable accounts for the 
number of parties in the local government.  It is included as recent evidence has shown that 
the size of local government coalitions (in terms of the number of parties) significantly affects 
government decision-making in Flemish municipalities (e.g. Ashworth et al., 2005, 2006; 
Geys, 2007; Goeminne et al., 2007).  
 
Finally, two comments should be made.  First, as noted in Section 3, public spending for 
cultural activities in Flanders is not restricted to the local governments, but also derives from 
higher-level governments.  This might be important when, as argued by Withers (1979) and 
Jenkins and Austen-Smith (1987), these different donors take into account each others’ 
spending decisions.  Moreover, to the extent that it is hard to observe whether a given 
provision of cultural goods is supported (mainly) through regional or municipal financial   20
support, the reaction of municipalities to what their neighbours do might also be affected by 
this spending.  This might be especially problematic in our analysis if spending by the 
Flemish Community is concentrated in larger cities (e.g. because these have more cultural 
organisations).  Unfortunately, data availability concerning the distribution of Community-
level cultural spending over the Flemish municipalities is unavailable, such that we cannot 
fully account for these effects.  Second, the right-hand side of equation (1) could be expanded 
by including a lagged dependent variable to control for slow adjustments in local cultural 
spending (i.e. “bureaucratic incrementalism”; Krebs and Pommerehne, 1995; Schulze and 
Rose, 1998).  Still, inclusion of this variable adds several econometric complications (Greene, 
1993) that are difficult to confront given the limited availability of historical data (see 
footnote 8).  Hence, we decided to leave the lagged dependent variable out of the main 
estimations.  However, preliminary findings including this variable show that a) municipal 
cultural budgets are indeed dominated by “bureaucratic incrementalism” and b) the main 





The estimation results are provided in table 1.  Column (1) presents the results from a linear 
OLS model that disregards any (potential) spatial pattern in the data.  Testing for the presence 
of such a spatial pattern in the errors of the OLS estimation through Moran’s I, we find that 
the test statistic is statistically significant.  The null hypothesis of no spatial effects can thus 
be rejected.  Moreover, robust LM tests – developed by Anselin et al. (1996) – indicate that a 
spatial lag model is most appropriate for our data.  The results of such spatial autoregressive 
regressions (SAR) estimations are reported in columns (2) through (6).  In column (2), 
neighbourhood effects are included with neighbours defined as two municipalities that share a   21
border.  In column (3), the neighbourhood criterion also takes into account the population size 
of a municipality’s neighbours.  Columns (4), (5) and (6) provide the results when awarding 
central places with a special status in the analysis (cfr. supra).  In column (4), we assess 
whether there is a different reaction to the spending of central places compared to that of non-
central places (cfr. H2a). In columns (5) and (6), we split the sample in municipalities with 
and without central place neighbours, to check whether the reaction to spending by small 
neighbours differs across both these groups (cfr H3). 
 
Before we discuss the results, it is important to note that OLS estimation of equation (7) leads 
to biased and inconsistent estimates due to the endogeneity of neighbours’ cultural spending. 
Hence, an instrumental variables (IV) approach is employed (which is somewhat easier to 
implement in our specific setting than its ML counterpart).
18  In line with the spatial 
econometrics literature, we use neighbours’ socio-economic, financial and political covariates 
as instruments for neighbours’ cultural spending (e.g. Heyndels and Vuchelen, 1998; Solé-
Ollé, 2003).  These instruments are jointly highly significant in the first stage regressions (not 
reported), suggesting there is no issue of weak instruments.  This conclusion is reinforced by 
the fact that they pass the Anderson identification test.  Also, the Hansen-J test cannot reject 
the null hypothesis of over-identification, indicating that the instruments are – as required to 
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Starting the discussion of the results with the central (neighbourhood) variables, we see in 
column (2) that there is clear support for positive spatial interdependence in municipal 
cultural expenditures in Flanders.  Cultural spending in neighbouring municipalities has a 
positive effect on cultural spending in any given municipality (supporting H4 rather than H1).  
These results therefore are supportive of the arguments that the arts are an ‘acquired taste’ 
(with consumption in surrounding municipalities instigating higher demand at home) and that 
local politicians tend to follow each other’s lead (as a rational response to inhabitants 
engaging in relative performance assessments).  An alternative explanation of this spatial 
pattern, however, may be a common intellectual trend rather than effective spatial interaction 
(Manski, 1993; Redoano, 2007).  Relying solely on the results in column (2) we are unable to 
distinguish which of both explanations drives this finding (a problem common in the spatial 
econometrics literature; Brueckner, 2003; Soetevent, 2006).
20   
 
Replacing the unweighted average level of neighbours’ spending by the population-weighted 
level of spending in neighbouring municipalities (in column (3)) leads to a fall in both the size 
and the statistical significance of the spatial parameters.  This can be interpreted as support for 
the idea that the incentives for free-riding are larger when neighbours are larger – in line with 
H2a.
21  This is further underlined in column (4) where we distinguish the effect central places 
have on their neighbours from that of non-central places.  The results show that the 
neighbourhood effect is only statistically significant for the latter.  That is, spatial 
interdependence is especially important between municipalities that are not central places.  A 
Wald test indicates that this difference between the effects of central and non-central places is 
statistically significant at the 10 percent level (Chi² (1) = 3.33). 
 
Finally, in columns (5) and (6), we separate the sample between those municipalities 
bordering a central place (column (6)) and those that do not (column 5)).  This allows a direct   23
test of proposition H3, which states that neighbours of central places may well disregard their 
smaller neighbours’ behaviour.  The results show a significant spatial pattern for 
municipalities not neighbouring a central place, while no significant interaction is found for 
neighbours of central places.  Neighbours of central places thus appear to largely disregard 
their neighbours.
22, 
23   
 
Turning to the control variables, population size is a highly significant determinant of 
municipal cultural spending.  The larger the population, the higher cultural spending per 
capita (the inclusion of a quadratic term proved insignificant).  Surprisingly, however, 
population density has a negative effect on municipal cultural spending.  Still, though robust 
in sign, the effect fails to reach statistical significance.  The share of inhabitants under 19 
years of age and the share of those above age 65 affect cultural expenditures differently.  
Indeed, while the former appear to reduce spending (though the effect is statistically 
insignificant), the latter increases spending.  This is in line with the idea that the elderly have 
a lower opportunity cost of time (Pommerehne, 1982; Schulze and Ursprung, 2000) and that 
young people may be less interested in (high-brow) cultural activities – or constrain their 
parents in going there.  Also, our results are supportive of the idea that culture is more 
appealing to people of higher educational status (Throsby, 1994).  Surprisingly, however, this 
does not hold for income (which appears to have no effect).  Income and educational 
achievement are, however, highly correlated (r = 0.79) and appear to generate a 
multicollinearity problem.  When leaving out either of these variables, the sign of the other’s 
coefficient estimate is correctly signed (i.e. positive) and reaches (or, in the case of income, 
approaches) significance at conventional levels. 
 
Two of our three financial variables have a significant effect on local cultural spending.   
Unsurprisingly, general purpose grants and the subsidies some municipalities receive under   24
the new Flemish legislation for appointing a cultural policy coordinator and drawing up a 
general cultural policy plan significantly increase spending on cultural policies.  This is in line 
with the finding of Hofferbert and Urice (1985, 325) that (federal-level) NEA grants in the US 
“seem to stimulate state arts spending”.  Finally, we find that the two political variables 
included in the model add little to the explanatory power of the model.  The coefficient 
estimates for both the ideological position of the government and the number of parties in the 
governing coalition fail to reach statistical significance (and, in the case of political 
fragmentation, are not robustly signed over the estimations).  Similar effects for political 
variables were retrieved in an analysis of Austrian federal-level cultural spending over the 





This paper addressed the question whether Flemish municipalities’ cultural spending is 
affected by the level of such spending in neighbouring municipalities.  In other words, we 
assessed the prevalence of horizontal interdependencies in local government cultural policies 
in Flanders.  The existence of such interdependencies in fiscal decisions has attracted a lot of 
scholarly attention in the recent literature (e.g. Brueckner, 2003; Revelli, 2005) and can be 
expected to play an important role in cultural spending as well.  Indeed, as the benefits of 
cultural spending by any given municipality cannot be reserved exclusively for its own 
inhabitants, municipalities are likely to be affected by each other’s actions.  To the extent that 
the arts are an ‘acquired taste’, consumption in neighbouring municipalities could result in 
higher demand at home.  Also, local politicians might mimic each other’s decisions as a 
(rational) response to citizens engaging in relative performance evaluations (i.e. voters using 
neighbours’ policies as a yardstick to judge their own incumbent’s performance).  However,   25
incentives for free-riding on neighbours’ provision of cultural activities may create a negative 
interdependence between cultural expenditures across municipalities.   
 
Importantly, the analysis is the first that attempts to assess the prevalence and importance of 
asymmetries in horizontal competition between municipalities depending on the urban status 
of a municipality’s neighbours.  We can exploit this differential behaviour of large and small 
municipalities’ neighbours due to the inherent advantage that large municipalities have in 
providing cultural goods (cfr. Heilbrun, 1992).  Although, to the best of our knowledge, such 
asymmetries have not been subject to empirical scrutiny before, the concentration of cultural 
talent in so-called ‘central places’ provides possibilities for economies of scale for both 
cultural producers and local governments.  This can be expected to affect neighbouring 
jurisdictions’ behaviour.   
 
Our main findings are first of all that Flemish municipalities’ cultural expenditures are 
positively affected by the level of cultural spending in their neighbours.  This is supportive of 
the ‘acquired taste’ and yardstick competition arguments (though it might also indicate an 
underlying common intellectual trend).   Secondly, when taking into account the distinction 
between ‘central place’ and ‘small’ municipalities, a more complex pattern arises from the 
data.  Spatial interdependence is then shown to be especially important between 
municipalities that are not central places.  Given that free-riding appears to be a stronger force 
for municipalities neighbouring central places, our findings cannot be solely driven by a 
common intellectual trend (as this would necessarily invoke positive spatial correlation).   
Finally, we find that small municipalities that border a central place tend to disregard what 
their smaller neighbours do.  Or, at least, that the free-riding effect is compensating to a 
higher degree in these municipalities for the elements generating positive spatial 
interdependence.  Hence, in line with the main proposition of the present paper, there are clear   26
asymmetries in the spatial pattern observed in cultural spending depending on the relative size 
of a municipality’s neighbours.  The spatial pattern across Flemish municipalities becomes 
significantly richer (and more complex) when taking into account the urban status of 
‘neighbours’. 
   27
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 Table 1: Estimation results 
Variable (1)





- 0.260  *** 
(2.79) 
- - -  - 
Population-weighted neighbours’ 
cultural spending 
- -  0.072  ** 
(2.10) 
- -  - 






















































































































































































Robust LM (error) 
Robust LM (lag) 
Anderson 















































Note:  N = 304; robust z-statistics in brackets; *** significant at 1% level, ** at 5% and * at 10%.  Moran I tests 
for spatial correlation in the OLS error term while robust LM tests assess whether this patterns is most 
likely to derive from spatial error or lag dependence (correcting for the other). The Anderson canonical 
correlation test assesses the relevance of our instruments while Hansen J test examines over-identification 
of these instruments.   33
Appendix A: Summary statistics 
 
Table A1: Summary statistics (N=304) 
Variable Mean





21.413 19.689  0.665 122.372 
Neighbours’ cultural 
spending 
23.841  10.536 5.129 72.326 
Population-weighted neighbours’ 
cultural spending 
33.565 20.911  6.072 111.986 
CP-neighbours spending 
 
23.671 36.608  0  121.138 
NonCP-neighbours spending  
 
22.879 9.944  5.351 85.510 
Population size (log) 
 
9.547 0.767 4.431  13.014 
Population density 
(per km²) 
512.513 441.297  52.079 3092.250 
% under 19 years 
 
23.044 1.846 17.934  28.822 
% over 65 years 
 
16.655 2.351 10.069  25.170 
Income 
(in 1000€) 
12.431 1.534  8.665 17.294 
Education level 
 
24.145 6.306  9.203 48.366 
Unemployment rate 
 
1.767 0.598 0.796 4.199 
General purpose grants 
per capita (in 1000€) 
0.114 0.063 0.075 0.821 
Cultural policy subsidies 
per capita 
1.736 2.786  0  18.225 
Debt per capita 
(in 1000€) 
1.089 0.483  0  3.546 
Number of parties in 
government 
1.868 0.728  1  4 
Ideological complexion of 
Government 
4.893 0.644  2.78  5.97 
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ENDNOTES 
                                                 
1   Withers (1979) and Jenkins and Austen-Smith (1987) study the relation between public cultural spending by 
different levels of government (arguing that, say, federal arts outlays in a given jurisdiction affect state and 
local expenditures in that same jurisdiction).  We regard horizontal rather than vertical interdependencies 
between governments.  
2   The most straightforward definition of a jurisdiction’s neighbourhood is geographical (e.g. jurisdictions 
sharing a border).  Still, one might also define the ‘peer’ group in terms of socio-economic or political 
similarities across jurisdictions (see e.g. Baicker, 2005; Van Parys and Verbeke, 2007). 
3   The reason – taken from financial economics – is that a decrease in the ‘strike price’ of an option (e.g. 
through lower anticipated travel costs) to acquire a given underlying commodity (i.e. cultural activities) 
increases its value.   
4   The influx of consumers from other jurisdictions may lead to (or enhance) potential congestion problems.  
As this generates costs for consumers (such as longer lines to buy tickets or reduced consumption 
experience due to noise; cfr. Traub and Missong, 2005), this is likely to strengthen the point made here: viz. 
pressure on governments in all concerned municipalities to increase cultural goods provision. 
5   Empirical evidence on the electoral cost of taxation mostly confirms the idea that voters engage in such 
relative performance assessments (e.g. Besley and Case, 1995; Ågren, 2005; Vermeir and Heyndels, 2006; 
Bosch and Solé-Ollé, 2007; see, however, Revelli, 2002). 
6   This ‘option value’ of the arts has received considerable attention in the literature.  Individuals, so the 
argument goes, might be prepared to pay “for the option to consume art at some unspecified future time, 
fully realizing that they may never choose to exercise that option” (Shanahan and Hendon, 1979, 12; for 
empirical support see Throsby and Withers, 1986; Morrison and West, 1986; Bille Hansen, 1997). 
7    Beside these specific grants and general-purpose grants, higher level governments may also provide 
matching grants when municipalities organize cultural activities.  Unfortunately, we lack data on the 
prevalence and importance of such matching grants. 
8   Data availability precludes inclusion of the remaining four municipalities.  Note also that the 2002 data are 
the most recent figures available and that a change in the municipal accounting rules in 2000 prevents us 
from using comparable data for a longer period of time.  This effectively constrains us to a cross-section 
analysis.  One important drawback of this is that there is no temporal development, making it hard to speak 
of ‘reactions’ to other municipalities’ behaviour in our findings.  Essentially, we assess the ‘equilibrium’ 
outcome of the interdependent process at a given point in time. 
9   The Flemish municipalities spent €132.6 million on local public libraries in 2002.  The ‘strict’ definition, 
however, excludes this spending.  The reason is that Flemish Regional legislation requires every 
municipality to have its own library.  One could argue that this diverts cultural spending from the budget of 
the higher-level government to that of the Flemish municipalities and thus ‘biases’ local spending upwards.  
Nonetheless, re-estimating the model including library expenditures and subsidies (the latter amounted to 
€43 million in 2002) does not alter the inferences from the analysis (full results available upon request).  
10   We assume that spending decisions are commonly observable and employ the contemporaneous level of 
cultural spending in the neighbouring jurisdictions.  This assumption – also made in Buettner (2001) and 
Allers and Elhorst (2005) – is plausible since council meetings in Flanders are open to the public (except 
when personnel issues are discussed). 
11   Given the small average distance between Flemish municipalities, we also experimented with a possible 
effect from second order neighbours (i.e. neighbours of neighbours; cfr. Heyndels and Vuchelen, 1998).  As 
such effects were never detected, this is not retained in the final version of the paper.  One might also use a   35
                                                                                                                                                         
distance-decaying weights matrix (with weights equal to the inverse of the distance between municipalities) 
to construct the neighbourhood variable.  We return to the results of such a specification in footnote 21 (and 
are grateful to Stefan Van Parys for providing these data). 
12   This redefinition is also important to appropriately account for ‘space’ in the spatial econometrics model.  In 
fact, Mutl (2006) has shown that size adjusted weighting matrices are crucial in settings with widely 
heterogeneous jurisdictions. 
13   This is the case for 13 Flemish cities: Aalst, Antwerpen, Brugge, Genk, Gent, Hasselt, Kortrijk, Leuven, 
Mechelen, Oostende, Roeselare, Sint-Niklaas and Turnhout (see Moesen, 2001).  Note that these 13 cities 
are also the only ones designated as either ‘large’ or ‘regional’ cities through an extensive cluster-analysis 
incorporating dozens of socio-economic indicators in five categories (i.e. use of land and buildings, income 
levels, economic activity and structure of working population, demographic structure and externalities) by 
Dessoy (1998). 
14   Since there are only 13 central places identified, assessing H2b is empirically difficult due to a lack of 
observations.  Nonetheless, preliminary tests indicate that the reaction of central places to their (smaller) 
neighbours is always positive (though not necessarily statistically significant). This indicates absence of 
free-riding behaviour, as expected under H2b.  Nonetheless, it also suggests some interaction between 
central places and their neighbours (due to yardstick competition, reference point effects or acquired taste 
effects, cfr. H4).  Note that we also tested for the reaction of central places to the cultural spending in other 
central places (rather than their immediate geographical neighbours).  Though coefficient estimations are 
positive, as might be expected, they fail to reach statistical significance. Given the insignificance of these 
results, we have not retained this extension in the main analysis.  
15   One alternative means to test H3 is to interact NonCP-neighbours spending with a dummy variable equal to 
1 for neighbours of central places (0 otherwise).  This implies estimation of regression equation (1) with the 
following neighbourhood variables: ψ (CP-neighbours spending) + ζ (NonCP-neighbours spending) + ξ 
(NonCP-neighbours spending)*NoCP, where CP- and NonCP-neighbours spending are constructed as 
before, ξ, ζ and ψ are parameters to be estimated and NoCP (Neighbour of Central Place) is a dummy 
variable equal to 1 if the municipality shares a border with one of the 13 Flemish central places.  H3 leads us 
to expect a negative effect on the interaction term (ξ), indicating that the behaviour of small neighbours is 
less influential on the behaviour of municipalities adjoining a central place than on those not bordering a 
central place.  While this approach effectively introduces multiple spatial regimes into the model (cfr. 
Bordignon et al., 2003; Allers and Elhorst, 2005), this alternative modelling strategy (inappropriately) treats 
municipalities that do not share a border with a central place as if they have a central place neighbour with 
no cultural spending.  This is not the case using the approach in the main text.  The results under both 
approaches are, however, qualitatively similar (see footnote 22). 
16    An anonymous referee pointed out that this variable may well be endogenous. However, the standard 
Hausman test of exogeneity does not support this and treating the variable as endogenous does not affect our 
results (available upon request). 
17   The data concerning a party’s ideological position were obtained from Rihoux (2001) and are based on a 
self-placement survey asking presidents and spokesmen of the parties in the municipalities to locate their 
party on an ideological scale between 0 (Left) and 10 (Right).  The figures range from 2.6 (Agalev) to 6.0 
(VLD) (the extreme-right-wing party Vlaams Blok – now Vlaams Belang – was not represented in any local 
government and is therefore not in the dataset).    36
                                                                                                                                                         
18   Preliminary tests show, however, that the basic findings of the analyses shown in columns (1) through (3) 
are also retrieved using ML estimation (even when we control for spatial error dependence).  In fact, the 
coefficient estimates (as well as statistical significance) are very similar under both procedures.  The results 
in Columns (4) and (6) would necessitate giving some municipalities in the sample values from two spatial 
weights matrices (which we were, unfortunately, unable to adequately implement using Matlab). 
19   In the analyses where central places are awarded a special status (reported in columns (4) through (6)), we 
expand the set of instruments with dummy variables indicating whether or not a given municipality borders 
one of more central places. This is necessary to increase the strength of the instruments in these estimations 
(though their exclusion does not affect the estimation results). 
20    To ensure that we are actually measuring spatial interdependence, we re-estimated the model using a 
weights matrix where neighbours are defined according to the alphabetical order of municipalities’ names 
(cfr. Case et al., 1993; Brown and Rork, 2005; Geys, 2006).  Every municipality is awarded one ‘neighbour’ 
preceding and following it in the alphabetical ordering.  Since this alphabetical ranking has nothing to do 
with the competitive forces between municipalities, the use of such a weighing scheme should not lead to 
significant estimates of the spatial parameter.  In line with this prediction, the estimations indicate the 
absence of spatial interactions using these alphabetical ‘neighbours’ (results available upon request). 
21   Using a distance-decay weights matrix gives a relatively large weight to cultural expenditures of large cities 
in the neighbourhood variable of all municipalities (due to the sheer size of cultural spending by large 
cities).  Free-riding behaviour on large city cultural spending (cfr. H2a) should then lead to more negative 
(or lower positive) values of the neighbourhood parameter estimate when using a distance-decay weights 
matrix.  Effectively, we even observe a negative spatial interaction coefficient (available upon request).  
This indicates that using a distance-based weights matrix (which implicitly gives higher weights to cities), 
the free-riding effect dominates. 
22    The alternative proposed in footnote 15 – i.e. inclusion of an interaction between NonCP-neighbours 
spending (i.e. the population-weighted average level of cultural spending in those of a municipality’s 
neighbours that are not central places) and a dummy variable equal to 1 for neighbours of central places (0 
otherwise) – indicates that the interaction term has the expected negative sign, but is statistically 
insignificant at conventional levels.  Hence, being situated next to a central place leads to a weaker reaction 
to small neighbours’ spending (though insignificantly so).  Note also that including a dummy variable for 
neighbours of central places directly into the analysis – in order to check whether vicinity to a central place 
an sich affects policy decisions – gives insignificant results (such that this dummy is not retained in the final 
model; except in the instrument vector). 
23   The Brussels Capital Region is geographically surrounded by Flanders.  Flemish municipalities bordering 
Brussels may thus be affected by cultural spending decisions in the Brussels Capital Region.  Unfortunately, 
lack of data on cultural spending in the Brussels municipalities prevents a direct test of this possibility.  As 
an indirect test, we re-estimated the model excluding municipalities that neighbour the Brussels Capital 
Region.  The findings are quantitatively similar to those presented in the main text (available upon request).  
Also, including a dummy variable to assess whether neighbours of Brussels act significantly different from 
the remaining Flemish municipalities indicates that this is not the case. 